

**Economics 109: Game Theory**  
Winter 2011, Professor Joel Watson

This course examines strategic situations, in which each agent's behavior generally affects the well-being of the other agents. Game theory is a technical framework for rigorously analyzing decision-making in such settings. Almost every type of interaction between living things is strategic. As social scientists, we focus on human interaction, and we shall assume that people behave in a rational, deliberate manner. In addition to exploring theory in the abstract, we will consider a variety of applications from economics, political science, and law.

**Schedule:** MWF 10:00 – 10:50 p.m. in Center 113. There are also problem-solving/discussion sessions on Mondays (7:00 – 8:50 p.m. in CSB 002). Lectures will be podcast at <http://podcast.ucsd.edu/>.

**Examinations:** There will be one midterm examination and a final examination. The midterm exam will take place on Wednesday, February 2, at 7:00 – 8:50 p.m. in Center 214. The final exam will be on Friday, March 18, from 8:00 to 11:00 a.m.

**Quizzes/Problem Sets:** Weekly problem sets will be assigned. There may also be occasional pop quizzes in class or on the Internet (through WebCT).

**Grading Weights:** Midterm 38%; final 50%; problem set completion (not graded)/quizzes 12%.

**Required Textbook:** Watson, J., *Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory* (W.W. Norton) **SECOND EDITION**.

**Class Website:** Materials will be posted on the WebCT page for Economics 109. Instructions for accessing WebCT are at <http://webct.ucsd.edu>. Students should log in regularly and check for announcements. Watson's web site is: <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jwatson/wcourse.htm>.

**Class Competitions:** If schedules permit, there may be a few optional competitions between the professor/TAs and the students.

**Teaching Assistants, Office Hours, and Responsibilities:** Elisa Hovander ([ehovande@ucsd.edu](mailto:ehovande@ucsd.edu), Econ 125), office hours TBA; Kristy Buzard ([kbuzard@ucsd.edu](mailto:kbuzard@ucsd.edu), Econ 123), Wednesdays 8:00 – 9:45 a.m., LEAD TA; Igor Vaynman (Sequoyah Hall 236, [ivaynman@ucsd.edu](mailto:ivaynman@ucsd.edu)), Thursdays 8:15 – 9:15 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. – noon; Ryan Fuller (Sequoyah Hall 139, [rsfuller@ucsd.edu](mailto:rsfuller@ucsd.edu)), Tuesdays 2:00 – 4:00 p.m. Office hour sessions for TAs may take place in an Econ Department conference room.

**Watson's Office Hours and Location:** Wednesdays 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., occasional extra sessions, and by appointment. Office hours will usually take place in Sequoyah Hall 244 (check in Econ 310 if no one is present in SH 244). **Please do not disturb Watson outside of office hours unless you have an appointment.**

**The fine print:**

- (1) Incidents in which students are suspected of cheating on exams will be reported to the administration.
- (2) Students have one week from the day in which the midterm examinations are returned to report errors in grading and/or to request that problems be re-graded. Re-grading may be requested for final exams through the first week of Spring quarter. If a student submits his/her exam for re-grading, then the student's entire exam will be re-graded by the professor (with no guarantee of a higher total score).
- (3) Students should attend and participate in class; their mobile phones and other devices should not. The professor will employ the necessary means to discourage classroom distractions.

## Course Outline

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Chapters in the textbook</u>
<b>A. Representing Games</b>	
Extensive form, strategies	1 – 3
Normal form, beliefs/mixed strategies	4 – 5
<b>B. Analysis of Static Settings</b>	
Best response, rationalizability, applications	6 – 8
Equilibrium, applications	9 – 10
Other equilibrium topics	11 – 12
Contract and law	13
<b>C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings</b>	
Extensive form, backward induction, SPE	14 – 15
Examples and applications	16 – 17
Bargaining	18 – 19
Negotiation equilibrium, examples	20 – 21
Repeated games, applications	22 – 23
<b>E. Information</b>	
Random events and incomplete information	24
Risk and contracting	25
Bayesian equilibrium, applications	26 – 27
PBE, applications	28 – 29

Not all topics/chapters will be covered.