

ECON 100CH

Spring Quarter 2019

Professor Andreoni

1. **Meeting Dates and times:** We shall meet on the Tuesdays from 2-3pm in room 244 SH, *EXCEPT FOR THESE TWO DATES*: Tuesday April 30, Tuesday June 4.
2. **Readings:** These will be drawn from the draft book chapters sent to you all on Triton Ed. There will be one chapter per meeting, hence you have received 8 chapters.
3. **Assignments:** Everyone must read and write a 3 page explanation of an academic article on topics related to the course. I will circulate a list of potential papers to choose from in week 3. Your two summaries are due anytime upto and including Friday June 7. Your assignments must be submitted as *.pdf files sent to Professor Andreoni on email to: andreoni@ucsd.edu with the subject “100CH Assignment”.
4. **Grades** Grades will depend on your summaries (60%) as well as your class attendance and participation (40%).

Life Lessons

A Course in Advanced Microeconomic Theory for Undergraduates.

UC San Diego 100CH Edition

Spring 2019

James Andreoni

April 9, 2019

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