PURPOSE

In 2007 I taught a course on prosocial behavior and social norms. Back then, the *homo economicus* assumption was still clinging to its throne, but in the meantime social-science research and findings about the importance of prosocial behavior have accumulated to the point that they persuade all but the most faithful believers. Another change from 2007 is that I have developed much stronger theoretical and practical understandings of social practices, which I wish to develop and refine in the course of the seminar. Thus, this course will not be a review of prosocial behavior, but rather will consider social practices: what they are, how to distinguish one type from one another, what motivates them, how identify them, and how to change harmful social practices and measure their change, among other topics.

More often than not, norms-talk in social science occurs in passing, and refers to anything vaguely evaluative that the researcher cannot otherwise explain. In contrast, our approach is precise and analytic. We will learn and discuss together the best literature on social practices, and when you complete the course you will be able to use and apply these concepts with confidence in novel domains of inquiry.

CONTACTS

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The WEST entrance of the SDSC is on Ridge Walk, north of the Social Science Building and south of Rimac Arena. A path goes downhill to the east. Take the path, enter the main door of SDSC, continue straight (east) until you run into windows and can go no further. Then, look right, you will see a sign for UC San Diego Center on Global Justice. Proceed to the sign, turn left, and continue to the end of the wing; CGJ offices are here.

Office hours: TBD or by appointment welcome
(858) 859-1185 rings all my phones

ASSESSMENT

- Attend and participate in all sessions (one nonexcused absence permitted; if more than one, then all absences must be excused). Each Sunday before class, by midnight, email the instructor the following exercise. 1. In one or a very few sentences, identify something important in the readings you did not understand. 2. In no more than about five sentences, identify something important in the readings that merits criticism. Do not overdo this assignment, it’s just to stimulate your thoughts and anchor our discussion. These two

Social Norms

1 April 2013

Political Science 219
Mondays 6:00-8:50
University of California, San Diego
Prof. Gerry Mackie
Spring 2013

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At the first session we will discuss together what assessments further our respective purposes.

- One possibility: A. Integrated summary of a week’s session, 3 pages (500-1000 words, penalty for exceeding 1000), emailed to instructor and class no later than Friday midnight AFTER a session. Don’t cover all bits and pieces, synthesize. Write as if it were a well-written report to a fellow graduate student. What did we learn, what don’t we know, how could we find out? Or, any other critically inquiring format. Do 5 times in the quarter. B. A 1500-word take-home final.
- Another possibility: a 20-page paper at the end of the course.

SOME IMPORTANT BOOKS (to be revised and expanded)

- James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*

None of these books are required. They are suggested for reference. They are only basic sources, ask me about any particular topic.

OTHER RESOURCES (to be revised)


NGOs: Tostan; Corpovisionarios; more to come

READINGS

I. Apr. 1, Introduction
REQUIRED
- Mackie et al, *What are Social Norms* (excerpt)
- Coleman, “The Demand for Norms” (ch. 10, *Foundations of Social Theory*)
- Jon Elster, Norms, chapter in *Oxford Handbook of Analytic Sociology*
- Cialdini and Trost, “Social Influence…” 155-162 ONLY
- Mackie, “Simple Game Theory”
- Bicchieri, “The Rules We Live By,” in her *Grammar of Society*

OPTIONAL

BACKGROUND READING -- these texts may be useful:
- Meier, “Prosocial Behavior” – If you lack background. Dated but no more recent review.
- Bruce Wydick, *Games in Economic Development*, simple game theory, examples from global development.
- Edna Ullman-Margalit, *The Emergence of Norms*, Oxford 1977. This inaugurated the analytic approach to social norms, and is still worth study (I have a pdf copy).

II. Apr. 8, Ontology of Culture; Early Childhood Normative Capacities

REQUIRED
- Searle, *Making the Social World*, 3-18
- Sperber, *Explaining Culture*, 56-118
- D’Andrade, “Some Kinds of Causal Powers that Make Up Culture,” from *Explaining Culture Scientifically*
- Boyd and Richerson, “Culture Evolves,” from *Not by Genes Alone*, 64-71 ONLY; 58-98 is recommended but NOT required
- Schmidt and Tomasello, “Young Children Enforce Social Norms”
- Wyman and Rakoczy, “Social Conventions, Institutions, and Human Uniqueness: Lessons from Children and Chimpanzees”
- Sabbagh and Henderson, “How an Appreciation of Conventionality Shapes Early Word Learning” ONLY 25-32
III. Apr. 15, Social Contagion, Social Proof, One-Way Dependence

- REQUIRED
  - Christakis and Fowler, *Connected*, 3-60, 95-134, 153-171
  - Christakis and Fowler, “Social contagion theory: examining dynamic social networks and human behavior”
  - Apicella et al., Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers
  - Salganik and Watts, “Leading the Herd Astray”

- OPTIONAL
  - Lyons, “The Rational Continuum of Human Imitation.” Imitation, even by human infants, is selective, not general.

- MORE READING

IV. Social Convention, Many-Way Interdependence

- REQUIRED
  - Young, “The Economics of Convention”
  - McAdams, “Conventions and Norms”

- Marmor, “Constitutive Conventions,” ONLY 36-44, in his *Social Conventions*
- Ackerman, “…Politeness…”
- Lessig, “Social Meaning”
- Rozin, “The Process of Moralization”
- Guala, “The Normativity of Lewis Conventions”

Apr. 22 Instructor Gone to University of Chicago Political Theory Workshop -- NEED TO SCHEDULE MAKEUP SESSION
• OPTIONAL (request from instructor)
• Southwood and Eriksson, “Norms and Conventions”
• Postema, “Conventions and the Foundations of Law,” this is an astounding and comprehensive review essay on both theories of social convention and their application to legal theory
• Kahan, “Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime,” applying Lessig
• Camerer, “Coordination,” from his Behavioral Game Theory, review of lab findings, a bit dated
• Devetag and Ortmann, “When and Why? A Critical Survey of Coordination Failure in the Laboratory”

V. Apr. 29, Descriptive Norms and Injunctive Norms (Cialdini & coauthors); Automaticity

REQUIRED
Several readings on descriptive and injunctive norms

Verplanken and Wood, Interventions to Make and Break Consumer Habits
Bicchieri, Habits of the Mind, ch. 2 of her Grammar of Society

OPTIONAL
Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition”
Baumeister et al., “Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?”

ALSO – AUTOMATICITY, WOOD, BICCHIERI

VI. May 6, Social Norms; Moral Norms

• REQUIRED
• Revisit readings from Week I.
• Bowles and Gintis, “Social Preferences” in A Cooperative Species
• Buckholtz and Marois, “The roots of modern justice: cognitive and neural foundations of social norms and their enforcement”
• Sripada and Stich, “A Framework for the Psychology of Norms”
• Paternotte and Grose, “Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?”
• Dubreuil and Gregoire, “Are Moral Norms Distinct from Social Norms?”
• Turiel on morality and convention, 94-118 from The Morality of Culture
• Schmidt et al., “Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator’s group affiliation”
• Finger, “Caught in the act: The impact of audience on the neural response to morally and socially inappropriate behavior”
• Sousa et al, “The Morality of Harm”

• OPTIONAL
VI. May 6, Economic, Social, and Moral Motivations

- Gneezy, “When and Why do Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior”
- Wiessner, “Norm Enforcement among the Juуhoansi Bushmen”
- Elster, “Emotions” from The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology
- Fessler and Haley, “The Strategy of Affect”
- Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures”
- Baumeister et al., “How Emotion Shapes Behavior”
- Eisenberg, “Does Rejection Hurt? An fmri Study of Social Exclusion”

OPTIONAL
- Herzog, “Politics of the Emotions,” 206-243 in his Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders
- Tangney et al., “Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior,” review essay
- Haidt and Kesiber, “Morality,” review essay by leading figure – be skeptical

VII. May 13, Legal Norms; Harmonization of Moral, Legal, and Social Norms

To be revised

VIII. May 20, Norms and their Change in the Field

To be revised: JP Platteau, Mackie, Dennis Chong

May 27 Memorial Day – NEED TO SCHEDULE MAKEUP SESSION

IX. Identity; Gender Roles and Norms

X. June 3, Norms in American Politics and in International Relations

- American Politics TO BE ARRANGED Donald Green & coworkers, voter turnout and peer pressure. What is “peer pressure”?
  - Bond et al., “A 61 million-person experiment…”
- International Relations TO BE ARRANGED Sikkink, Keohane, Keck, Finnemore & others. This work is growing in weight and has some influence. There are three problems though: it does not crisply differentiate among types of social practices; it is based on an outdated structuralist-functionalist theory
of social norms; it often treats states and other institutions as if they were individuals with a human moral psychology. Even if one is not interested in the IR application, it will be quite instructive to compare our norms theories to the more traditional norms theories extant in IR.