

133A: Japanese Politics

(日本政治)

Winter 2015, Room CTR 212, MWF, 3:00-3:50 pm

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Yellow highlights reflect the corrections made on January 6, 2015.

Important Dates & Deadlines:

January 21 (W): Quiz I. In-class, closed book quiz on the Puzzles 1 and 2.

February 9 (M): Quiz II. In-class, closed book quiz on the Puzzles 3 and 4.

March 9 (M): Distribute final exam questions in the class.

March 18 (W): Submit a hardcopy of final essays (take-home, open book) between 3-6pm in TAs’ offices (third floor of social science building).

About this Course:

This course will introduce you to nine important puzzles/questions about Japanese politics, discuss various ways in which scholars have attempted to solve these puzzles, and suggest pathways for future research.

Part I: Foundations of Japanese Politics

Puzzle 1. Are Japanese politics “unique” or “different” from other developed nations (e.g., the United States)?

Puzzle 2. The Long-term Survival of the Liberal Democratic Party

Puzzle 3. “Miraculous” Economic Growth and Stagnation in the 1990s

Puzzle 4. Egalitarian Development and the Rise of Inequality in the 1990s

Part II: Explaining Public Policy Outcomes (Applied)

Puzzle 5. Gender gap in the workplace and at home

Puzzle 6. Why no civil society movement against the nuclear energy despite the Fukushima disaster?

Puzzle 7. Do Japanese consumers “prefer” higher-priced domestic food? If so, why?

Puzzle 8. Territorial conflicts and constitutional revision

Puzzle 9. Why does the Japanese government accept low-skilled, foreign workers through a temporary, internship program?

In the process of trying to solve these puzzles, we will learn:

(i) Important actors in Japanese politics;

e.g., politicians and political parties, bureaucrats, firms and citizens

(ii) The positions that different actors take with respect to various policies, as well as the sources of these policy preferences;

(iii) How political institutions such as electoral systems and parliamentary committee systems block or enhance the representation of these actors' interests.

The class will *not* emphasize the rote memorization of facts (although you will need to know the basic facts in order to understand why things happened the way that they did), nor will it emphasize the simple digestion of big-picture scholarly debates.

The focus of this class will be on learning how to conduct **critical and in-depth analysis of policy and political events in Japan**, and gaining the **practical skills** necessary to do your own independent research. By the end of this class, you should be able to read news on Japanese politics and be (better) able to assess: (i) who are the major players in the event (“**actors**”), (ii) what these actors wanted (“**policy preferences**”), (iii) the relative balance of power among these actors (“**power and influence**”), and (iv) why some actors won over others (“**explaining policy outcomes**”).

REQUIREMENTS

(1) Readings

I will assign three articles or chapters (60-100 pages) each week. Readings are available on e-reserve at: <https://ted.ucsd.edu/>. To do well on the exams (i.e., better grade than B), you must read the assigned materials carefully before the class, attend class each week, and be prepared to **discuss the readings analytically and critically in your essays**.

(2) Two, in-class closed book quizzes. 20% of final course grade each (20*2=40%)

Quiz I (January 21, Wednesday): Test your understanding of the readings & lectures on Puzzle 1 (Campaign) and 2 (the LDP survival).

Quiz II (February 9, Monday): Test your understanding of the readings & lectures on Puzzle 3 (Economic growth) and 4 (Egalitarian development).

(3) Final Essays (Take-home, open book. About 8-10 pages. Distributed on March 9 and due March 18, between 3-6pm at TAs' Offices) 50% of final course grade

You are required to complete two essays. The first essay will ask you to contrast two to three theories we will cover to explain one of the five puzzles we discuss in the class after (chosen by lottery in the class) and to discuss each theory's strengths and weaknesses. The second essay question will describe a political event that actually happened in Japan recently using newspaper articles and ask you to identify actors, preferences, and the relative power balance, and then provide your explanation for why a particular policy was adopted. You are free to consult materials outside of the class readings, such as journal articles, books or newspaper articles (but NOT Wikipedia).

(4) Class Participation (10% of final grade)

You speak up in the class regularly, i.e., at least once a week: 10 points
You speak up in the class at least three times during the quarter: 5 points
You speak up in the class less than three times during the quarter: 0 points

(5) Q and A Challenge! Bonus points, maximum 20 points.

During our class, you will receive five points (5% of final course grade) each time for **asking** an interesting question on Japanese politics that I cannot answer off the top of my head. "An interesting question" should not be a factual, trivia question (e.g., what is the name of Ichiro Ozawa's wife?). The question should not be about the future, either, because we are not prophets. **The question must make us think and require some research to answer (which I call "mini-research").**

You will also receive five more points for presenting your mini-research in the class **answering** the question the following week. Mini-research is open to anyone in the class, whether you asked or did not ask the particular question. By "mini-research", you will have to spend at least 30 minutes doing research and making power point slides summarizing what you found (see possible sources of information at the end of this syllabus). Please upload your mini-research slides on our TED website **at latest 10 minutes before the lecture**. See the template for mini-research presentation at the end of this syllabus.

CLASS POLICY

Extensions and Quiz Retake

You must have a documented reason (i.e., medical, extenuating personal circumstances, etc.) for not being able to turn in an assignment or quiz on time. You will need to bring in supporting documentation to be granted an extension or request a quiz retake.

Grade Appeals

You have one week after I return the essays to appeal the grade. All appeals must be made to your TA. You must submit a typed, double-spaced, statement explaining why you are requesting a grade appeal and justify it with evidence from your essays and class participation. If you choose to appeal your grade, your TA reserves the right to decrease the existing grade. His/her decision is final.

Assignments/Late Papers

Note that we will **not accept** any email submission of your essays or quizzes. We will, however, accept late final exam in our mailboxes, which are located on the third floor of the Social Sciences Building. Late essays will be penalized one third of a grade per day (e.g., an A- paper becomes B+ the next day) until it bottoms at C. Note that essays that are turned in after 5 pm on Friday will not be counted as turned in until Monday morning. **Late papers will not be accepted past noon of three days after the deadline.**

Academic Honesty

Cheating, plagiarism and other violations of academic honesty are **serious offenses** and **will not be tolerated**. Please refer to the UCSD policy on integrity of scholarship for further details. If you are caught cheating in this course (this includes plagiarism), you will receive a letter grade of F. I reserve the right to check your essays electronically when necessary.

January 5 (M): Overview of the Class and Logistics

- (a) Overview of the syllabus & logistics
- (b) Introduction to the documentary—"Campaign (*Senkyo*)"

PART I: Foundations of Japanese Politics

January 7 & 9 (WF): The Election Campaigning, Japanese Style?

Puzzle 1: Are Japanese politics "unique" or "different" from other advanced industrialized nations (e.g., the United States)? If so, how? If not, what are the similarities?

Documentary—"Campaign (*Senkyo*)" (each class we watch this documentary for the first 30 minutes; followed by 20 minutes Q and As)

Discussion Questions: What are the similarities and differences between Japanese election campaigns (refer to Curtis 1992, pp. 222-243 & the documentary) and the U.S. versions? What are the possible explanations ("theories") for these similarities and differences?

Readings:

Curtis, Gerald. 1971. *Electoral Campaigning, Japanese Style*. pp. 33-86 (Chap 2&3)

Curtis, Gerald. 1992. "Japan," in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds.). *Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 222-243.

Also see background materials on PBS Website:

http://www.pbs.org/pov/campaign/campaign_background.php

January 12, 14 and 16 (MWF): The Survival of the Liberal Democratic Party

Puzzle 2. The Long-term Survival of the Liberal Democratic Party

(a) The Question: Clientelism or Flexible Adaptation?

Curtis, Gerald. 1988. *The Japanese Way of Politics*. Columbia University Press. pp. 1-79.

Scheiner, Ethan. 2006. *Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 7-30; 64-89.

(b) Changes since the 1990s: Recession, Coalition Government, and Electoral Reform

Kabashima, Ikuo and Gill Steel. 2007. "How Junichiro Koizumi seized the leadership of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 8, pp. 95-114.

(c) Case Study: A Closer Look at the 2009 Election

No readings. Lecture & our findings from pre-election & post-election legislator surveys.

Discussion Questions: What are the existing explanations for the long-term LDP dominance? Which theory can *also* account for the popularity of Koizumi (2001-2006)?

NOTE: No class on January 19 due to holiday

January 21 (W): In-class quiz on Readings & Lectures on the Puzzles 1 & 2 (Closed Book)

January 23 (F): Guest Lecture, Charlie McClean, Studying and Working in Japan.

January 26, 28 and 30 (MWF): Explaining Economic Growth

Puzzle 3. “Miraculous” Economic Growth and Stagnation in the 1990s

(a) The Question: Bureaucrats or Market?

Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. pp. 1-82.

World Bank. 1993. *The East Asian Miracle*. Policy Research Report of the World Bank. pp. 1-26.

(b) Case Study: Automobile Industry

Reed, Steven R. 1993. (Chapter 5) “Making Common Sense of Government-Business Cooperation,” in *Making Common Sense of Japan*. Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press.

(c) Stagnation in the 1990s: Bureaucrats, Politicians, or Market Revisited

No readings. Lecture.

Discussion Questions: What roles did politicians play in making miraculous economic growth possible? Do the readings assigned this week address this? If not, why not?

February 2 & 4 (MW): Why Egalitarian Development and its Demise in the 1990s?

Puzzle 4. Egalitarian Development and the Rise of Inequality in the 1990s

(a) The Question: Equality Made by Government or Society?

Kume, Ikuo. 1998. (Chapter 1) “Disparaged Success.” In *Labor Politics in Post-War Japan*. Cornell University Press.

Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2008. *Welfare and Capitalism in Post-War Japan*. Cambridge University Press. (Introduction and Chapter 1).

Also skim http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Margarita_Estevez-Abe.pdf for a short summary of the change after the electoral reform of 1994.

(b) The Rise of Inequality in the 1990s

Ohtake, Fumio. 2008. “Inequality in Japan.” *Asian Economic Policy Review*, Vol.3, Issue 1.

(c) Case Study— The Government’s Response to Youth Unemployment (“NEET”)

Genda, Yuji. 2007. “Jobless Youths and the NEET Problem in Japan.” *Social Science Japan Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp 23–40.

Discussion Questions: In the U.S., the question of to what extent a government should respond to widening inequality is a highly partisan issue. How do the politics of inequality play out in Japan where there was no major partisan turnover before 2009? Who contributed to the reduction and widening of inequality? Bureaucrats, politicians, businesses, or labor? How about the citizens?

February 6 (F): Guest Lecture by Professor Kentaro Fukumoto, Gakushuin University, Tokyo.

“Election, Distribution, and Mobilization: Natural Experiments in Japan.”

February 9 (M): In-class quiz on Readings & Lectures on the Puzzles 3 & 4 (Closed Book)

PART II: Explaining Public Policy Outcomes (Applied)

February 11 and 13 (WF): Gender Inequality

Puzzle 5. Gender Gap in the Workplace and at Home

(a) The Question: Policy/Institutions, Economy or Culture?

Norgren, Tiana. 1998. “Abortion before Birth Control: The Interest Group Politics Behind Postwar Japanese Reproduction Policy.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 24 (1): 59-94.

Frances, Rosenbluth, ed. 2007. *The Political Economy of Japan's Low Fertility*. (Introduction and Overview). Stanford University Press.

(b) Case Study: The New Politics of Low Fertility and “Child Subsidies” under DPJ

Discussion Questions: Who benefits and who loses from declining fertility in Japan? What can a government do to increase fertility?

(Note: No class on February 16 due to holiday)

February 18 & 20 (WF): Energy Policy—Nuclear and Its Alternatives after 3.11.

Puzzle 6. Japanese citizens have been known to oppose having nuclear weapons. Despite this sentiment and Fukushima disaster, we have not seen the civil society movement against the nuclear energy or many politicians pledging to reduce nuclear energy. Why?

(a) The Question: Nuclear Energy in the Nuclear-Allergy State

Cohen, Linda, Mathew D. McCubbins and Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1996. "Chapter 7. The politics of nuclear power in Japan and the United States," in Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins eds., *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, available at: <http://mmccubbins.ucsd.edu/artb11.pdf>

Martin Dusinger and Daniel P. Aldrich. 2011. "Hatoko Comes Home: Civil Society and Nuclear Power in Japan," *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 70, No. 3 (August) 2011: 1–23. Available at: <http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/Dusinger-Aldrich-JAS-2011.pdf>

Aldrich, Daniel P. 2011. "Future Fission: Why Japan Won't Abandon Nuclear Power," *Global Asia*. Vol.6. No.2. summer 2011. Available at: <http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/Aldrich-Global-Asia-June-2011.pdf>

February 23, 25 & 27 (MWF): Agricultural Protectionism

Puzzle 7. Do Japanese consumers "prefer" higher-priced domestic food?

(a) The Question: Protectionism or Food Nationalism?

Yusaku Horiuchi and Jun Saito. 2010. Cultivating Rice and Votes: The Institutional Origins of Agricultural Protectionism in Japan. *Journal of East Asian Studies*. Volume 10 (2010), 425–452.

Naoi, Megumi and Ikuo Kume. 2011. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession." *International Organization*, Vol.4.

(b) Case Study: The politics of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

March 2, 4 and 6 (MWF): Territorial Conflicts and Constitutional Revision

Puzzle 8. What motivates the Japanese government to take an aggressive position on territorial disputes with South Korea and China? Do territorial conflicts lead to less trade among the nations?

Curtis, Gerald L. 2013. Japan's Cautious Hawks: Why Tokyo Is Unlikely to Pursue an Aggressive Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, March/April Issue, Volume 92.

Masaru Kohno. 2012. Looking at the Takeshima and Senkaku Problems through Successive Public Opinion Surveys. Available at:
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/wol/dy/opinion/gover-eco_121126.htm

Davis, Christina and Sophie Meunier. 2011. Business as Usual: Economic Responses to Political Tensions. *American Journal of Political Science*. Volume 55, Issue 3, pages 628–646, July 2011.

Views from South Korea (Optional)

Koji Kagotani, Kan Kimura, and Jeffrey R. Weber. 2014. Democracy and diversionary incentives in Japan–South Korea disputes. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*. 2014 14: 33-58.

March 9 & 11 (MW): Immigration

Distribution of Final Exams on March 9

Puzzle 9. Why does the Japanese government accept low-skilled, foreign workers through a temporary, internship program?

Keiko Yamanaka. 1993. “New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in Japan.” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 66.

Shipper, Apichai W. 2005. Criminals or Victims? The Politics of Illegal Foreigners in Japan. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.31 (2), Summer 2005, pp. 299-327

Discussion Questions: What are the pros and cons of a more open labor market for various actors—the Japanese government, businesses, labor, politicians, and citizens?

March 13 (F) Final exam Q/A Session

Final Essays Due between 3-6pm in TAs' Offices on March 18 (Wed)

Template for Analyzing Politics and Policy Outcomes

(1) **Identify relevant actors.** Usual suspects: politicians, political parties, bureaucrats, interest groups (business, farmers, doctors etc), voters, media, NGOs, foreign governments, etc.

(2) **Lay out what these actors want** (i.e., policy positions) **and why** (votes, money, power, ideology, culture, etc). If there is a divergence of preferred policy options among actors (even within the same political party, bureaucracy, or industry etc), or ambiguity of policy positions, discuss them.

It is important not to “settle down” quickly with a conventional wisdom or cursory reporting of the news media. Keep asking yourself, are you really convinced? If not, you can point to the ambiguity and discuss what you are not sure about. What the class needs to hear is not the facts or the correct answer. It is your thought process based on the materials you found. Use your imagination, too, just like when you read a novel: if you were in his/her shoes, what policy would you prefer?

Useful Tips: When discussing politicians, think about their three common incentives: votes, seats, and policy. Mobilizing campaign donations (money) often helps them get reelected, too.

It is sometimes unclear what bureaucrats want. Some scholars argued they want to maximize their budget, staff members, and jurisdictions (Niskanen). Others have argued that they were committed to realize their ideal policies.

Industries and firms generally want to maximize their income, but they sometimes diverge from this prediction due to imperfect information and market failure.

There are also psychological theories on why people (appear to) behave irrationally. See Naoi & Kume, 2011 on agricultural protectionism (Week of February 23).

(3) **Power:** Whose opinions are likely to be reflected in the policy-making and why?

This gets to the question regarding various sources of power that industries and citizens have: votes, money, power to organize (e.g., concentration and intensity of interests), information, and legitimacy etc. Institutions, such as electoral systems and party systems, can empower some actors and disempower others. Socio-economic organizations, such as labor unions and industry associations, can also shape their bargaining power over policies. We cover these topics in the Part I: Foundations of Japanese Politics.

(4) **“Good analysis” will:** (i) go beyond what news reports said, and discuss what they did not report or any ambiguity that is left in the newspaper articles and (ii) discuss the

difference between what the readings (or, “theories”) will predict and what you found in the research, (iii) provide some critiques of the readings (or, “theories”) based on (i) and (ii).

Sources for your original research:

Please do *not* cite Wikipedia. As Michael Scott (in the TV show “The Office”) said: “Wikipedia is the best thing ever. Anyone in the world can write anything they want about any subject...you know you are getting the best possible information”. **NOT.**

Scholarly Articles:

<http://scholar.google.com/>

Citation counts relative to when it was published is a good proxy for the impact and quality of the article and/or the book.

Newspaper Articles:

Factiva and Lexis Nexis Academic are the two best sources for English-language news on Japan. Factiva also has Japanese-language newspaper article as well.