

INTL 102 Economics, Politics & International Change:

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific

Spring Quarter 2019

**Tuesday and Thursday, 12:30 PM-1:50 PM
RBC Auditorium**

This course provides a survey of the international relations of the Asia-Pacific. The course is divided into four modules:

- Historical background and theories for thinking about the international relations of the region, focusing particularly on the rise of China.
- A look at key strategic relationships, covering the main actors: the US, China, Japan, Taiwan, the two Koreas and Southeast Asia.
- A consideration of how economic interdependence and institutions affect the prospects for conflict and cooperation.
- A look at some key military-strategic issues: the prospect for arms races, the South China Sea and the new questions arising out of the cyber domain.

Faculty and Teaching Assistants

Professor Stephan Haggard

Office hours: W 11:30-12:30, Th. 2-3:30, RBC 1425. A sign-up sheet is posted on the door.

TAs and office hours:

Patrick Hulme (mhulme@ucsd.edu), Tuesday and Thursday, 9-10, RBC 3131

D.G. Kim (dak110@ucsd.edu), Tuesday and Thursday, 2-3, SSB 331

Liana Wong (liw062@ucsd.edu), Monday 10-11 and Wednesday 2-3, RBC 3132

Anh Nguyen (ann038@ucsd.edu), Wednesday 8:30-10:30, RBC 3131

Sections will *not* meet the first week of class.

Course Requirements

There are four components to your grade in the course.

- Each student will be required to write one short **policy memo** of about 1000 words. You will sign up for these essays in your first section and receive additional instructions. This paper will count for 20% of the final grade.
- There will be unannounced **quizzes** during the quarter in your sections. They will require you to answer simple questions demonstrating that you have done the reading. These will

count for 10% of your grade.

- An in-class **mid-term** will count for 25% of your grade, and a final for 35%. The mid-term will cover all assigned material—lectures, readings and section discussion—through May 9. The **final** will cover the entire course. The midterm and final will consist of two parts: short identifications; and one or two essay questions.
- **Participation** in sections accounts for the remaining 10%

Course Readings, Lectures and Podcast

All readings and lecture slides will be posted on TED except those that are hyperlinked in the syllabus; note that you may need to be on campus or connected through a VPN to access some readings. “Documents” are primary sources that are also required reading. You will benefit more from the class if you do the reading by the date it is assigned. Lectures will be podcast and are available [here](#).

Statement on Academic Integrity

All work should be original and written exclusively by the students. All assignments will be turned in through Turnitin.com AND in hard copy form the day they are due. All cases of suspected cheating will be referred for adjudication to the Office of Academic Integrity and the Assistant Dean of Student Affairs in the Office of Graduate Studies. Any violation for which a student is found responsible is considered grounds for failure in the course, not simply on the assignment. To review the policy, please go [here](#).

Module I. Theoretical and Historical Issues

April 2 (Tuesday): Introduction: Military and Political Foundations of the Postwar International Order in Asia

We begin with an overview of the postwar security order in Asia, a direct result of great power and civil wars: World War II, the Chinese revolution and the Korean War. This system was rooted not only in alliances but a broader institutional order led by the United States.

Documents:

Yalta Agreement on Japan, February 11, 1945.

The Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945.

SCAP General Order no. 1, September 2, 1945.

April 4 (Thursday): Challenges to the Postwar International Order in Asia: Some US Thinking

China’s rise has generated very different reactions. Some, like John Ikenberry, believe that the Western liberal order is likely to persist. Others, such as John Mearsheimer are more pessimistic. What are the conclusions reached by these contending theories and what evidence can be provided in support of them? And where does the Trump administration fit in this debate?

G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2008).

John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3 (2010). Not required: for more Mearsheimer see the conclusion to his new book [here](#) or watch one of his lectures, for example [2013 Harper Lectures here](#). For some personal background on these big ideas, see the interviews with John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye [here](#). Note how their very different personal experiences of China influenced their views.

The National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, pp. 25-28 (up to *Renew Capabilities*) and 45-47 (up to section on Europe).

April 9 (Tuesday): Domestic Sources of International Politics: Historical Legacies and Nationalism

An altogether different approach to the politics of the region is to see conflicts as rooted in domestic politics. These theories include those related to the idea of the democratic peace—that democracies don’t fight one another—with the implication that democracies and authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience conflict. These theories also encompass those related to history and nationalism. Note that these issues are not simply those that divide Japan from its neighbors: there are also questions about how the Chinese Communist Party has chosen to construct—and reconstruct--the country’s history.

Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 52, 4 (2008): 783-806.

Joanna Diaz, “Negotiating the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue in the 21st Century,” December 2018, Institute for Security and Development Policy [here](#).

Document:

Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion (The Comfort Women Agreement), December 28, 2015 [here](#).

II. The Great Powers, Alliance Relations and Cold War Legacies

April 11 (Thursday): The Changing US-Japan Alliance

The US-Japan alliance is not an alliance in the traditional sense; it is a unilateral security guarantee by the US. This fact is grounded in the nature of the post-war constitution and the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which has been the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. Is Japanese foreign policy changing—particularly under Prime Minister Abe—and if so how and why?

Policy memo: Argue **for** or **against** the following statement:

“Prime Minister Abe should move forward to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” (Article 9 is a clause in the national Constitution of Japan outlawing war as a

means to settle international disputes involving the state. The constitution was imposed during the allied occupation of Japan following World War II.)

Jeffrey Hornung and Mike Mochizuki, "Japan: Still an Exceptional U.S. Ally," *The Washington Quarterly*, 39, 1: 95–116

Jeffrey Hornung, "Revising Japan's Peace Constitution: Much Ado About Nothing," March 21, 2018, *War on the Rocks* blog [here](#).

Documents:

Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, September 8, 1951.

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, January 19, 1960.

For those writing on this prompt, see *Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People* July 1, 2014 at [here](#).

April 16 (Tuesday): Asia's Pivot: Sino-Japanese Relations

China-Japan relations are arguably the real pivot of Asian peace and security. Japanese policy has largely been to accommodate and even facilitate China's rise. But conflicts in the East Sea around the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands are clearly one of the region's potential flashpoints, in part because of the way they necessarily engage the US.

Policy memo: Argue **for** or **against** the following statement:

"Japan should continue to accommodate China's rise." Make sure to consider the particular ways that Japan might or might not "accommodate" China in the East China Sea and if you argue against such accommodation, suggest alternatives.

Taylor Fravel, "China's Assertiveness in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute, MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 016-19.

Madoka Fukuda, "Maintaining Momentum in Japan-China Relations," *East Asia Forum*, March 27, 2018 [here](#).

April 18 (Thursday): The China Debate I: The Elements of Peaceful Rise

Under Deng Xiaoping China concentrated on domestic economic developments, articulating a strategy known as China's "peaceful rise." What were the components of this policy approach?

Policy memo: Argue **for** or **against** the following statement:

"China should abandon its strategy of peaceful rise."

Zheng Bijian, "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs*, 84, 5 (September/October 2005): 18-24.

Avery Goldstein, "Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30, 4 (2007): 639-682.

April 23 (Tuesday): The China Debate II: Has Something Changed?

Perhaps the most significant debate in the IR of the Asia-Pacific is whether Chinese foreign policy has undergone any significant change since 2010 and under Xi Jinping in particular. To what extent should China be characterized as newly assertive, and what does that mean anyway?

Policy memo: Write a memo for a US or Asian intelligence agency on what indicators you would look at to judge whether China is becoming more “assertive” or not.

Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 7, 2 (Summer 2014) [here](#).

Susan Shirk and Orville Shell, *Course Correction: Toward and Effective and Sustainable China Policy*, Asia Society February 2019, pp. 8-12 (*Taking Stock of 2017-19 and Emerging Challenges to US Interests*).

April 25 (Thursday): The Taiwan Issue

The Taiwan question went quiet as the KMT sought to build closer economic and political ties with the mainland. But that quiet was disrupted first by the Sunflower movement—mass protests around a pending trade agreement (the ECFA) with the mainland—in 2014 and then by the re-entry of a DPP government into office in 2016. Some have argued that making concessions on Taiwan might be one way to accommodate China’s rise while Trump’s comments on ending the One-China Policy renewed discussion about a stronger US commitment to Taiwan.

Policy memo: Write a memo on whether the United States should reach a deal or make concessions to China with respect to Taiwan. Be clear on what these concessions might be and the effects of doing so, both on Taiwan and China.

Richard Bush, *A One China Policy Primer*, The Brookings Institution, March 2017, [here](#).

Charles L. Glaser, “A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security* 39, 4 (2015): 49-90. Read the whole article if you are writing a policy memo on the topic, but otherwise just read the summary [here](#).

Documents:

The three communiqués (1972, 1979 and 1982) as well as the “six assurances” to Taiwan (1982) [here](#)

Highlights of Ji Jinping’s speech on Taiwan, China Daily, January 2, 2019. Be sure you read all three pages [here](#).

April 30 (Tuesday): South Korea: The Alliance and Beyond

The US-Korea alliance is a direct legacy of the Korean War. It continues to encompass

traditional issues of deterrence and extended deterrence. But South Korea has to balance its interests with the US and China. What does it mean to “strengthen” the alliance exactly?

Policy memo: Argue **for** or **against** the following statement:

“The “three no’s” are an appropriate strategy for South Korea in its effort to balance its relationships with the United States and China.” China recently put economic pressure on South Korea in response to its decision to deploy a ballistic missile defense (BMD, and specifically THAAD or Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense) battery. It then appeared to lift those sanctions, but in an apparent agreement on the part of the South Korea to abide by “three no’s” (no additional THAAD deployment, no participation in the US’s missile defense network and no establishment of a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan).

Terence Roehrig, “South Korea’s Foreign Policy Options: Strengthening the ROK-US Alliance,” [The ASAN Forum](#), May-June 2015.

Ankit Panda, “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do and Why is China Mad About It?” [The Diplomat](#), February 2017.

Bonnie Glaser and Lisa Collins, “China’s Rapprochement with South Korea: Who Won the THAAD Dispute?” *Foreign Affairs*, November 7, 2017 [here](#).

Documents:

Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, signed October 1, 1953

May 2 (Thursday): The North Korean Nuclear Crisis

The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is now over a decade old. Multiple efforts have been made to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and missile programs. But the Six Party talks collapsed in 2008 and there is little sign that they will be revived any time soon. Is it possible to get North Korea to disarm, or must the five parties live with a nuclear North Korea?

Policy memo: Write a policy memo on whether the United States should recognize North Korea as a nuclear power.

Stephan Haggard, “Is the Korean Peninsula Stable? [Part 1](#) and [Part 2](#). (Written at the time of escalating tensions following the third nuclear tests in February 2013).

Nicholas Anderson, “America’s North Korean Nuclear Trilemma,” *Washington Quarterly* Winter 2018, 153-164.

Philip Zelikow, “How Diplomacy with North Korea Can Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 9, 2018 [here](#).

Stephan Haggard, “Reading the Third North-South Summit,” *NKNews*, September 19, 2018.

Documents:

“Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” Beijing 19 September 2005 at [here](#).

Singapore summit Joint Statement, June 12, 2018 [here](#).

May 7 (Tuesday): Southeast Asia 1: the ASEAN Way and Its Critics

ASEAN appears to play an important political role in Southeast Asia but analysts have a hard time figuring out what it is. Goh sees a subtle but ultimately sophisticated strategy; others (Martin-Jones and Jenne) are much more skeptical. What was ASEAN designed to do and has it accomplished its objectives?

Policy memo: You have been asked by the leadership of the US or an Asian government of your choosing to write a memo assessing decision-making within ASEAN and what the organization can achieve. Should your country be taking ASEAN seriously or not? Why or why not?

Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN’s Leadership in East Asian Region-Building: Strength in Weakness,” *The Pacific Review* 27, 4 (2014): 523-541.

David Martin Jones and Nicole Jenne, “Weak State’s Regionalism: ASEAN and the Limits of Security Cooperation in Pacific Asia,” *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, 2015.

May 9 (Thursday): Southeast Asia 2: Responding to China’s Rise

How are Southeast Asian countries responding to China’s rise? Using realist terminology, are they balancing, band-wagoning, or hedging, in effect a combination of the two strategies? To what extent are economic ties and patronage a source of influence? Responses are clearly not uniform. What factors—including domestic political ones—might explain variance across countries?

Policy memo: You have been asked by a Southeast Asian government of your choosing to write a memo about whether or not to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative. Should Chinese investment in your country be welcomed or resisted? Please be specific in outlining what your country’s national interests are and consider what policies your government might pursue to realize these objectives.

Prashanth Parameswaran, “ASEAN’s Divided Approach to China’s Rise,” The ASAN Forum, October 6, 2016 [here](#).

Yun Sun, “Winning Projects and Hearts? Three Cases of Chinese Mega-Infrastructure Projects in Southeast Asia,” *ASAN Forum*, November 3, 2017 [here](#).

May 14 (Tuesday): In-Class Midterm Exam. The mid-term covers all material through May 9th.

III. The Regional Political Economy and its Consequences

May 16 (Thursday): The Evolving Economic Order of the Asia-Pacific

Economics has a significant influence on international politics. First, what are the patterns of long-run growth in the region and the prospects going forward? Second, how have these been related to the nature of trade and investment networks in the Asia-Pacific and how did they evolve? Finally, what role have financial flows played in the region, and in the US-China relationship in particular?

Richard Baldwin, “21st Century Regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 20th century trade rules,” CEPR Policy Insight #56, May 2011.

May 21 (Tuesday): The Political Effects of Economic Integration

The effect of economic integration on peace is a highly debated issue. On the one hand, are liberal arguments about the positive effects of trade on peace. On the other hand, there are persistent questions of whether greater openness generates political leverage for actors like China. Moreover, trade itself generates conflict as the US-China trade war has shown.

Thomas Wright, “Sifting Through Interdependence,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2013: 7-23.

Evan Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?” *Marco Polo* blog, July 25, 2017 [here](#).

Stephan Haggard and Barry Naughton, “A Timeline of Trump Administration Trade Policy.”

May 23 (Thursday): The Conflict over Economic Institutions

In the last decade, East Asia has seen dramatic growth in the number of economic institutions, including high-level meetings among leaders and economic organizations in the form of free trade agreements. The rise and fall of the TPP raised important questions about economic leadership the region.

Michael Green and Matthew Goodman, “After TPP: The Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 38, 4 (2016): 19-34.

Yoichi Funabashi, “In America’s Absence, Japan Takes the Lead on Asian Free Trade,” *Washington Post*, February 22, 2018 [here](#).

The Economist, “What is China’s belt and road initiative?” May 15, 2017 [here](#).

IV. Security Issues

May 28 (Tuesday): The Military Balance in the Asia-Pacific

Shifts in the balance of power are politically relevant in part because of how they translate into military capabilities. How are those capabilities shifting and what are the strategic implications? Kang argues strongly that countries in the region are not balancing Chinese power. Is this because they recognize the effort is futile—and therefore have to accommodate China’s

rise—or is it because they don't see China as posing a real military challenge? Or is it because they rely on the United States to maintain the balance, even though the relative capabilities of the US are eroding?

David Kang, *American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the 21st Century*. Cambridge University Press, 2018, ch. 3.

Michael Beckley, "The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion," *International Security* (Fall 2017) [here](#).

May 30 (Thursday): The South China Sea

The South China Sea is consistently identified as a potential "flash point" in East Asia. Yet there is wide disagreement on whether these land features—some little more than rocks—are strategically significant or not. The question lingers because of competing claims, competing legal interpretations, and above all Chinese land reclamation efforts. Should we worry about the South China Sea or not?

Ben Dolven et. al. *Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options*. Congressional Research Service, 2015, entire.

Marc Valencia, "A New Normal in the South China Sea?" *East Asia Forum*, Ma 26, 2018 [here](#).

June 4 (Tuesday): New Issues: Cybersecurity in US-East Asia Relations

Conflicts in the region are not limited to conventional security and economic issues but have extended into the cyber domain. What are the views of the major parties on these issues and how do states defend, deter or cooperate to limit tensions in this new domain?

FireEye, "Red Line Drawn: China Recalculates its Use of Cyber Espionage," June 2016.

Stephan Haggard and Jon Lindsay, "North Korea and the Sony Hack: Exporting Instability Through Cyberspace," [here](#).

Elias Groll, "Trump Has a New Weapon to Cause Cyber Mayhem," *Foreign Policy*, September 21, 2018 [here](#). Contains link to the new National Cyber Strategy.

June 6 (Thursday): The International Relations of the Asia-Pacific: Looking Forward

Campbell and Ratner argue that "engagers" got China wrong. Did they? Or is there risk attached to the Trump approach as well, as the Shirk-Shell report points out. Note Congress has also intervened by passing a bipartisan United States' Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. Do its priorities line up with those of the Trump administration?

Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, "The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations," *Foreign Affairs* March/April 2018 [here](#).

Susan Shirk and Orville Shell, *Course Correction: Toward and Effective and Sustainable China Policy*, Asia Society February 2019, pp. 7-14.

Carl Thayer, "ARIA: Congress Makes Its Mark on US Asian Policy," January 9, 2019,

The Diplomat [here](#).

June 10 (Monday): Final Exam 11:30am-2:30pm (location to be announced).