

## Course Description

This course explores how a group of European states forged a political consensus, and a lasting set of policy agreements, in a world often considered anarchic. We will explore the history of European cooperation and look at how this cooperation functions in a few specific issue areas.

To the extent that you consider the EU's record an example of successful international cooperation, it begs a particular set of questions. Why do states cooperate in some cases and not others? Why do some states seem more willing to cooperate? Why does cooperation seem easier on some issues than others?

Deals to cooperate are often frustrated by the threat of defection. Building a good cooperative agreement presents participants with some important questions. Can the negotiators on the other side enforce the agreement at home? Can participants convince partners that they really intend to cooperate? Can they punish members to an agreement when they do defect?

## Objectives

By the end of this course, you should be on your way to a better understanding of the following:

- 1) The challenges inherent creating a cooperative agreement. When and why do participants refuse to cooperate? When and why does fear of defection undermine cooperation?
- 2) The types of guarantees or institutions can help ameliorate these challenges.
- 3) How European states created these guarantees or institutions. How well would this process work in other contexts where parties seek an agreement that makes them vulnerable? In what circumstances do negotiating parties already benefit from institutions or guarantees?
- 4) The patterns in strong and weak cooperation among European states on different issues. Why are states less cooperative on some issues than others?
- 5) The threats and weaknesses that remain in European cooperation. What happened in Brexit? Will it happen again?

While we will spend the vast majority of our time discussing the European Union and agreements related to it, notice that the most important lessons we will cover are not specifically

about the EU. Rather, we study the European Union as an example of a more general paradox: it is often difficult to get individuals to cooperate, even when cooperation would obviously benefit them.

This course invites you to consider the how the motivations of different parties attempting to cooperate ultimately frustrate a bargain, and how altering those motivations might benefit a bargain. This examination of the interaction between strategic actors is often known as political economy, game theory, or modeling. This way of thinking can be useful to anticipate and understand how to solve (or create) problems for cooperation in a variety of other circumstances. Your main goals for the class should therefore be to learn how to articulate the major challenges to cooperation and how to analyze the European project as an example of those principles, with the hope that you can recognize and analyze the reasons for cooperative failure elsewhere.

## **Course Policies**

### *Academic Dishonesty*

Cite all ideas or work that is not your own. When in doubt, cite. Plagiarism will result in a failing grade in the course, and is completely unnecessary. You can earn an A in this course citing every single sentence of every single assignment you turn in.

### *Harassment*

Threatening or inappropriate behavior is not expected in a university course. They are also not tolerated. Any reports of harassment will be referred to University administrative offices.

### *Late Work*

Late work will be docked 10% per day without a valid excuse accepted by your very skeptical instructor.

## **Required Texts**

All readings will be made available through the course TED site under the content tab. If you are of age and plan to drink away the money this saves you on textbooks, you may address your first toast to “John, the greatest instructor UCSD ever had the wisdom to hire”.

## **Grading**

### *Participation 30%*

Participation breaks into two components. First, points are awarded for class attendance and participation in discussion. Second, points are awarded for good-faith effort to participate in the EU Negotiation exercise detailed below, and in the other games we play in class.

### *Mid-Term 25%*

The mid-term exam will consist of two short essay questions. Answers should be three to four pages for each question, double spaced. I will hand out the mid-term after class session five and collect the answers by email before the start of class session six.

### *EU Exercise 45%*

Over the course of the class, each of you will represent an EU country in a wave of negotiations over new EU policy. This will require you to write a short memo explaining your positions on these issues, with evidence that you can implement these initiatives at home.

Then, after accessing the class's memos, you will draft a strategy that details the other countries with whom you will attempt to build a coalition. We will spend two 45 minute sessions in class wheeling and dealing, then in the last class we'll review some voting rules, adopt the new EU agenda, and calculate how many points your country gets.

By way of a final exam, you will write an analysis of your performance. What happened? How do you expect your people to react? Have you presided over a Brexit?

Grades are holistic to your level of dedication and negotiating skill over the course of the exercise, but you will get feedback along the way. We will spend quite a bit of time discussing this exercise in class.

### *Extra Credit*

In some classes, we will play some simple card games. Players with the most points at the end of each game will take home a few extra credit points. The stakes for each game will be explained the day of.

## **Class Schedule**

### **Class 1 (8/7) Syllabus, Goals, Basics of Scientific Method, and Definitions**

What is an institution? What role might institutions play in facilitating cooperation? What is the assumption of anarchy, and why do some people theorize that institutions might manage the challenges anarchy creates for cooperation?

How can we test these ideas? Assume that we want to understand when and how institutions work and when and how they fail? How do social scientists use a version of the scientific method to test theories in the real world?

### **Class 2 (8/9) Structural Challenges to Cooperation: Part 1**

### *Readings*

Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy" *International Organization*

*Discussion Questions*

How are stag hunts and prisoner's dilemmas different? Why do we expect different outcomes for cooperation in each game? What forces push cooperation games into prisoner's dilemma territory, and what characteristics of issue spaces or institutions can push them back toward stag hunts?

Please note: this article is very hard reading, but it's the only thing assigned this week. It forms the foundation of the rest of the class, so understanding it is very important. We will spend a lot of time discussing the key concepts.

**Class 3 (8/14) NO CLASS**

**Class 4 (8/16) Structural Challenges to Cooperation: Part 2**

*Reading*

Putnam, R. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games" *International Organization*.

*Discussion Questions*

How might the logic of a two-level game frustrate cooperation in a context like the EU? How might it frustrate compliance with an agreement already made? How are these two issues related?

Look ahead to classes 7-9. In what ways might domestic and international levels of the game conflict? What challenges might this create, specifically, for cooperation?

**Class 5 (8/21) The European Union: Part I MID TERM OUT**

*Readings*

Moravcsik, A. "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft" *International Organization*

Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Ch 1-2

*Discussion Questions*

What is Moravcsik's theory about why the Single European Act negotiation worked? Why didn't others? What explanations does he reject? If Moravcsik is correct, what lessons does it teach us about the rules of cooperation explored by Axelrod and Keohane?

Look ahead to our discussion of Brexit. Does Brexit make Moravscik wrong? If not, how can we harmonize Moravscik's theory with the events of Brexit?

Moravscik argues that EU structure and policy depends upon the preference of Germany, France and Britain; if they prefer the deal to the consequences of being cut out of the Union. Can this help us explain the structure of the EU described in Hix? Why might EU member states have agreed to these checks and balances?

### **Class 6 (8/23) The European Union: Part 2 MID TERM DUE**

#### *Readings*

Tsebelis, G., and Garrett, G. "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union" *International Organization*.

Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Ch 3-4

#### *Discussion Questions*

How do EU legislative and judicial systems compare to domestic systems, such as those in the US? Are there reasons that a super-national system would be structured differently to achieve agreement? What evidence do you see of commitment mechanisms like those discussed in Putnam or Axelrod and Koehane?

### **Class 7 (8/28) Trade Policy in the European Union**

#### *Readings*

Hanson, B. "What Ever Happened to Fortress Europe? External Trade Liberalization Policy in the European Union." *International Organization*

Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Ch. 12 pp 331-341.

#### *Discussion Questions*

What fear is Hanson addressing about the European Union and trade? Why does integration within the EU give rise to these fears outside it? Why does Hanson argue that such concerns have not come to pass?

What are the testable implications of Hanson's theory? How does Hanson purport to test this? Against what will he compare EU performance?

Hix lists several protectionist mechanisms available to EU trade policy. Are EU member states really as helpless as Hanson makes them out to be?

## **Class 8 (8/30) Common Foreign and Security Policy** [First Round Policy Talks]

### *Readings*

Jensen, Slapin, and Konig. “Who Calls for a Common Foreign Policy?” *European Union Politics*.

Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Ch. 12 (finish); Hix, S. The Political System of the European Union. Ch. 9 pp 250-256..

### *Discussion Questions*

Based on our readings and discussions from the first few classes, would you expect agreement on security policy in Europe to be easier or harder to achieve than common trade policy? What explains any differences in your expectations? Do the results bear out your reasoning?

Is Jensesn, et. al.’s account of foreign policy agreement different from Hanson’s explanation of trade?

How does Hix’s description of the CAP’s purpose square with Hanson’s characterization of the EU as liberal on trade? How is the EU thumbing the scales in the agricultural market? What problems did EU policy cause in terms of agricultural market distortion?

## **Class 9 (9/4) CANCELED (Labor Day)**

## **Class 10 (9/6) Explaining Brexit and the Future of the EU** [Agenda Voting]

### *Readings*

Hobolt, S. “The Brexit Vote: a Divided Nation, a Divided Continent” *Journal of European Public Policy*.

Siune, K., Svensson, P., and Tonsgaard, O. “The European Union: the Danes Said ‘No’ in 1992 and ‘Yes’ in 1993. How and Why?” *Electoral Studies*.

Patterson, L. “Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: a Three-level Game Analysis”

### *Discussion Questions*

What determines when and whether citizens in individual states will accept the influence of the European Union in domestic politics? Do you think that state and European leaders understood these pressures as they built the various institutions of the European Union?

Pretend you are a European negotiator working with a new potential member state. What affect does this knowledge have on your demands of the potential member state? How might you mitigate the concern of a Brexit? Do you want to?