This course examines strategic situations, in which each agent’s behavior generally affects the well-being of the other agents. Game theory is a technical framework for rigorously analyzing decision-making in such settings. Almost every type of interaction between living things is strategic. As social scientists, we focus on human interaction, and we shall assume that people behave in a rational, deliberate manner. In addition to exploring theory in the abstract, we will consider a variety of applications from economics, political science, and law.

Prerequisites: Econ 100C or Math 31CH or Math 109 or both CSE 20 and Math 20C.

Lectures and Problem Sessions:

You are responsible for all the material in the lectures. Partial notes will be available on the class webpage before each lecture. I recommend that you print these out before hand and fill in the missing information. I’ll do my best to avoid typos but you’re responsible for the correct material. I want you to understand the material instead of simply memorizing it. If you miss a lecture, borrow someone’s notes. Discussion sessions are optional but recommended.

Exams:

Your grade will be determined on the basis of a Midterm Exam (40% or 30% of your grade) and a Final Exam (60% or 70%). The weights will be chosen so that you receive the highest grade. If you miss the midterm for a documented, university approved reason (ie., illness, official university trip) the weight for that exam will be placed on the final. If you miss the midterm for another reason (ie., oversleep) you will receive a zero for that exam. No one will be allowed to start an exam after the first person leaves.

The midterm will be held in class on Thursday, July 19th. The final exam will be held on Saturday, August 4th from 3:00pm – 6:00pm. If you know in advance that you cannot make an exam, please let me know as soon as possible.

You are only permitted to use pens and pencils, a straight edge and a note card during the exams. Calculators are not allowed. The note card can be any size up to 8.5” by 11”. It may have handwritten notes on both sides. Typed or mechanically reproduced notes are not permitted. Do not attach anything to your note card.

During the exams you cannot sit next to anyone with whom you studied.

Academic dishonesty:

I take academic dishonesty seriously. Any student found guilty of academic dishonesty will earn a failing grade for the course. In addition to this sanction, the Council of Deans of Student Affairs will also impose a disciplinary penalty. For a review of UCSD policy, please see http://www-senate.ucsd.edu/manual/appendices/app2.htm.
Regrade requests:

For the midterm regrade requests are only permitted if you pick up the exam at the instructor’s or TA’s office and look through the exam with either of them. The deadline for regrade requests is Friday, July 27th. (Note: The instructor and TA are not guaranteed to be available on Friday, July 27th. More specific details will be given during that week.)

For the final exam regrade requests are only permitted if you take the entire exam in pen. These requests must be made in writing no later than the second week of the Fall 2012 quarter.

If you request a regrade I may regrade your entire exam and your score could go up, down or stay the same.

Text:

We will follow the textbook closely and practice problems will be assigned from it.

Practice Problems:

Practice problems will be available online. We will go over these questions in office hours and in the discussion sessions. Your best practice for the exams is to try these questions yourself first.

Preliminary Course Outline:

1. Representing Games
   a. Intro, extensive form representation, strategy  
   Ch. 1-3
   b. Normal form representation, mixed strategies, beliefs, expected payoffs  
   3-5

2. Analysis of Static Settings
   a. Dominance, best response  
   6
   b. Efficiency, rationalizability  
   7
   c. Examples  
   8
   d. Nash equilibrium, examples, applications  
   9-10
   e. Mixed strategy NE, strictly competitive games, security strategies  
   11-12

3. Analysis of Dynamic Settings
   a. Extensive form sequential rationality  
   14
   b. Subgame perfection, examples and applications (two lectures)  
   15-16
   c. Bargaining  
   18-19
   d. Repeated Games  
   22-23

4. Information
   a. Incomplete information, examples  
   24
   b. Bayesian Nash equilibrium, examples  
   26-27
   c. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, applications  
   28-29

(Note: This course outline is preliminary. I’ll provide a more specific set of readings in the lecture notes.)